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CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR 
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In examining the enabling role of government, we consider two primary issues. First, when 
designing regulations, defining property rights, promoting standards and, indeed the terms of 
market interactions, governments can encourage innovation by ensuring that pioneer firms and 
entrepreneurs can receive the appropriate reward in the market-place from their innovative 
efforts. Second, good information is crucial to the efficiency of markets and to the ability of 
discerning consumers to drive innovation by providers. Governments can promote good 
information flows both by finessing the ‘rules of the game’ in markets and by ensuring that the 
information and other content that they fund is widely and freely available to be used by 
consumers, and to be re-used and transformed into new value-added products by firms further 
down the production chain.  
MARKET FORMATION 
Markets in which people compete for private gain can only come into existence against a 
backdrop of shared practices and expectations. Because these ‘rules of the game’ are a public 
good, governments are unsurprisingly involved in their provision and enforcement. Often the 
most efficient and innovative solution to an emerging problem is to develop a market – as we 
are doing with emissions trading. 
Governments may actively create new markets, as the Australian Government is seeking to do 
through the establishment of an emissions trading scheme. As the Garnaut Climate Change Review 
draft report identifies1, clear, credible and consistent policy frameworks that provide investors 
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same time, the monopoly rights instilled in the owners of the intellectual property (IP) generally 
allow them to price it at above the marginal costs of its provision, which is often near zero. 
Though we can recognise such a solution as ‘second best’ in some sense, if patents and 
copyright increase the production of IP, this will generally be better than the alternative of not 
having the IP. As the Productivity Commission has compellingly argued with regard to 
infrastructure pricing, given the regulator’s inevitable ignorance of the exact point at which 
price is optimal, it is important to err on the side of too high a price than too low a one.3 The 
consequences of a somewhat too high a price will be some (usually relatively small) reduction in 
demand. The consequence of too low a price will be inadequate incentives to invest in new 
facilities. Where these facilities are facilities of national significance like airport runways, the 
absence of such investment can lead to huge congestion costs.  
Similar logic can be applied to IP. But there is a caveat which is increasingly important: The 
development of intellectual property is cumulative. In the words of Sir Isaac Newton, we stand 
on the shoulders of giants. Because new knowledge always builds on old knowledge, the 
property rights we have erected to encourage innovation can actually obstruct it. 
This is particularly so where intellectual property rights are too easily granted, and where they 
are ambiguously defined, so that innovators are uncertain as to what innovations might be 
subject to the prior claims of patent holders. There have been some worrying trends in this 
regard in recent years. In the last three decades judges have overturned important ‘gatekeeping’ 
principles of the patent system that existed until the early 1980s. Thus it had been held that 
software and business methods could not be the subject of patents. But this has been 
overturned. Likewise the tests of non-obviousness and ‘analogous use’ have become much less 
stringent – as some have argued, to the point of vacuity. 
There is mounting evidence that this is impeding rather than stimulating innovation. There is 
widespread anxiety about whether a ‘patent thicket’ has developed in software as a result of 
software patenting with many large firms consciously developing ‘patent pools’ with which to 
defend themselves against others’ patent claims. Alas a patent pool does not defend against 
‘patent trolls’ who may be relatively small companies with little to lose and much to gain in 
threatening large firms with patent infringement suits. A recent study found that the more 
patents held in a market, the less likely new firms were to enter and the greater the delays they 
faced in obtaining finance.4  
Software patents and patents on business methods – particularly methods of finance – each of 
which has burgeoned in the wake of judicial reinterpretation of previous taboos on such 
patents, are unusually liable to litigation. Intellectual property scholars James Bessen and 
Michael J. Meurer conclude from their extensive research that: 
software patents are four times more likely to be litigated than are chemical patents; 
business methods patents are twelve times more likely to be litigated; finance patents 
are 49 times more likely.5 
                                                        
3 See e.g. Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy Reforms, pp. 295–302. 2005. 
4 See Cockburn, I. M., and MacGarvie, M. J., Patents, Thickets and the Financing of Early-Stage Firms: Evidence 
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Though these results are for the US, they raise important concerns. Indeed as IP Australia 
stated in its submission: 
The Australian High Court has recognised that the level of invention required to 
obtain a patent in Australia is lower than elsewhere.6 
At the very least in the interests both of harmonisation7 and better public policy the hurdle for 
registering a patent in Australia should be as stringent as other countries.  
The issue of patentable subject matter is currently before the Advisory Council on Intellectual 
Property. However it is not clear that a revision of patentable subject matter can address the 
fundamental problems. Our international obligations under the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) code and Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (AUSFTA) constrain the options available to us as Australia has agreed under these 
instruments not to excise specific areas of technology from the patent system. Hazel Moir’s 
submission proposes that we could: 
add codification proportions and development cost minima as new threshold tests 
for patentability. While far more complex and thus riskier (who knows what the 
courts would read into such limitations), this would be a TRIPS-compliant approach 
to limiting the scope of patents to those areas of innovation where patent policy is 
likely to enhance rather than reduce welfare.8 
As Moir points out, one of the major problems here is that intellectual property policy is being 
managed as a legal issue, whereas although this area like any other must operate through the 
legal system, intellectual property policy is most fundamentally an aspect of economic policy. 
Before the economic reforms of the last two decades what we now know as competition policy 
– which was then known as ‘trade practices’ policy fell within the portfolio of the Attorney 
General’s Department. Given its economic significance it is now located within the Treasury 
portfolio. Today copyright policy is handled within the Attorney General’s Department whilst 
patents are handled within the Innovation portfolio. Nevertheless the consideration of policy 
with regard to both is dominated by IP practitioners and by the beneficiaries of the IP system. 
We need the expertise of lawyers in this as in many other areas of policy but it is imperative that 
IP policy make the transition that competition policy made over a decade ago now, from a 
specialist policy area dominated by lawyers, to an important front of micro-economic reform.  
Finding: Currently, the ease with which patents are being granted in areas such as software and 
business methods is very likely hampering innovation. 
Recommendation 7.2 Patent law should be reviewed to ensure that the inventive steps required to 
qualify for patents are considerable, and that the resulting patents are well defined, so as to 
minimise litigation and maximise the scope for subsequent innovators. 
Recommendation 7.3 Professional practitioners and beneficiaries of the IP system should be 
closely involved in IP policy making. However IP policy is economic policy. It should make the 
same transition as 
                                                        
6 IP Australia – Submission no. 537 p. 52, citing Lockwood Security Products Pty ltd v Doric Security Products Pty 
Ltd (No. 2) [2007] HCA 21 and Aktiebolaget Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 59. 
7 ibid. p. 43.  
8 Moir, Hazel – Submission no. 513, p. 18 
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THE COSTS OF ENFORCING IP RIGHTS. 
A further important problem in our intellectual property regime is the high and rising cost of 
enforcing intellectual property rights. In the words of the Attorney General Robert McClelland, 
in some areas the adversarialism of court procedure has been ‘a disaster’. 
It is becoming increasingly evident that modern litigation is no longer an efficient 
model of dispute resolution when confronting complex business transactions.9 
Many Australian innovators feel an acute lack of access to cost effective dispute resolution in 
the Australian system. Thus for instance the IP Australia submission reports that: 
One of the main issues associated with IP rights enforcement is the costs associated 
with taking enforcement action. There is also a view within the small business 
community that litigation is about who has the greater financial resources rather than 
whether the IP right is valid or infringed. Such practices can lower confidence in the 
IP system and limit the benefits of IP protection to those who have large financial 
resources.10  
The panel endorses the initiatives discussed in IP Australia’s submission to use IP Australia’s 
resources to help encourage litigants to make less use of litigation and be more responsible in its 
use. However such moves will only have limited affect where larger firms are using IP litigation 
in a strategic way to take advantage of their size in disputes with smaller firms. It is important 
that legal procedure more fully internalise the principle that legal costs should be proportionate 
to the amounts at issue in specific legal disputes. 
It is to be hoped that the Attorney-General’s initiatives will substantially streamline civil 
procedure. There are also initiatives within some states and territories to do likewise. It will be 
important for those interested in innovation to make the case for such streamlining strongly. 
However there is a long history of modest outcomes from reviews of legal procedure. It is to be 
hoped that at least in some specialised areas more radical experiments might be tried, for 
instance stronger steps towards the level of case management typical of some of Europe’s more 
efficient civil law systems. It would be very much in keeping with the spirit of innovation if 
some experiments of this kind could be undertaken in the area of IP litigation.  
In the meantime there is a simple procedural rule that could be introduced into intellectual 
property litigation that would ‘level the playing field’ somewhat between large and small firms 
and so lead to a fairer and more efficient IP system. A right to opt out of ‘appellate double 
jeopardy’ would give each party to a dispute the right to elect not to appeal the finding of the 
court of first instance, except where the appellant funded the costs of both itself and its 
opponent. Wherever either side had exercised such a right, both parties would be bound by it; 
that is neither party could appeal the decision of the court of first instance without meeting all 
their opponents’ costs. 
Recommendation 7.4 Firms asserting or defending intellectual property should have a right to opt 
out of ‘appellate double jeopardy’. 
                                                        
9 McClelland, R, Australian Financial Review Legal Conference, 17th June 2008, available at  
www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/www/ministers/RobertMc.nsf/Page/Speeches_2008_17June2008-
AustralianFinancialReviewLegalConference. 
10 IP Australia – Submission no. 537, p. 40. 
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IMPROVING INFORMATION FLOWS 
Information is central to the functioning of the economic system. As Friedrich Hayek pointed 
out, markets have the advantage that they use information wherever it exists in an economy, 
whereas governments with their central decision making find this difficult if not impossible. On 
the other hand as Joseph Stiglitz points out, ‘information economics does not agree with 
Hayek’s assertion that markets act efficiently’.11 
With neither markets nor governments being ideal institutions for optimising the generation 
and handling of information, the best outcome is likely to be produced by some appropriate 
hybrid of the two.  
One of the perennial problems of markets is ‘asymmetric information’ where one party to a 
transaction knows more than another. For this reason all developed countries regulate 
minimum levels of disclosure in a range of transactions, for instance in the case of consumers 
and investors. Such regulation has nevertheless often had disappointing results, not least 
because of the complexity of disclosure that has been mandated and its tendency to swamp 
people with information.  
Amid a range of relatively disappointing results from mandatory disclosure regulation there 
have been some important and suggestive success stories – see Box 3.  
Box 3: Some examples and principles of targeted transparency 
In their book Full disclosure: the perils and promise of transparency American scholars Archon 
Fung, Mary Graham and David Weil outline a range of regimes that mandate disclosure to 
consumers which were designed to improve information flows. The two most successful 
examples of what they call ‘targeted transparency’ demonstrate the link between good 
information flows, demanding customers and innovation. 
Los Angeles required restaurants to display prominently on their front window the rating they 
had received for hygiene from the government regulatory regime. Importantly the rating was to 
be displayed as a simple ‘A’, ‘B’ or ‘C’ classification which was easily understood by consumers. 
With this information so prominently available to consumers, consumers were more easily able 
to demonstrate their preferences. Virtue in such matters became its own reward; and perhaps 
more pointedly, vice became its own punishment. The public’s unsurprising distaste for bad 
hygiene kicked off a vigorous race to the top with restaurants striving to move up the ladder, 
particularly from a ‘C’ grading with a range of beneficial impacts, not least lower admissions to 
hospitals for food poisoning. 
Regulations identifying sports utility vehicles’ (SUVs) stability at speed also struck an important 
blow for road safety with the less stable SUVs suffering a sharp fall in demand and car makers 
responding with improved product safety.  
In addition to these examples, the authors also show how such disclosure regimes can fail, for 
instance because of their complexity, as in the case of pollution reporting.  
Fung et al.’s conclusions about transparency might be summarised as follows: 
 Targeted transparency must be user centred. 
 Successful policies focus on the needs and interests of users. They should also be focused 
on the capacities and inclinations of disclosing organisations. They should seek to embed 
new information in the decision making routines of users and to embed user responses into 
the decision making of disclosers. 
 The policies must be politically sustainable. 
                                                        
11 Information, by Joseph E. Stiglitz at www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Information.html. 
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The success stories however illustrate an important point: where a demand for better 
information is met, consumers of goods and services will become more discriminating and this 
will produce premiums for those goods and service providers (newly) discovered to be of 
superior quality. As Michael Porter points out, demanding customers often drive a culture of 
innovation and excellence within the industry servicing such customers. And the industries 
which learn from the most demanding consumers often become world leaders. 
Governments can drive this through mandatory disclosure requirements. For example, the draft 
report of the Garnaut review proposes mandatory energy efficiency labelling of refrigerators 
and probably the fuel efficiency or emissions intensity of cars12. Greater mandatory disclosure is 
often attractive to policymakers aware of some problem or other but wary of the pitfalls of too 
heavy-handed regulation. Requiring greater mandatory disclosure in such circumstances can 
meet the need for something to be done about some perceived problem or other without 
risking any major policy error.13 But as we have seen, for instance, with disclosure on 
investments, it is not without its pitfalls.  
There may be scope to make substantial progress in improving information flows in markets 
without compulsion. Note that the examples of mandatory disclosure above, such as the energy 
efficiency of fridges and vehicles, all involve the reporting against an auditable standard which 
provides a means by which people can compare the relative performance of different products.  
In other areas one might ask what information flows might be facilitated by the emergence of 
an auditable standard according to which results might be reported voluntarily. And what might 
be required to have an auditable standard emerge? Here no firm in an industry may have 
sufficient incentive to establish the standard. This is because any firm adopting the standard 
would have to promote it heavily to bring it to the market’s attention. Firms that did not 
perform as well, but which were disadvantaged by the first mover’s promotion of its own 
results, would retain the option to report their own results against some other standard which 
produced more favourable results for it.  
In such circumstances, a standard might emerge from some leadership if it were possible to get 
‘buy in’ from a sufficient number of market participants. This might be possible if governments 
acted as the catalyst. Thus for instance a government might invite the best firms in an industry 
to develop an auditable standard against which to report. These firms have an incentive to 
facilitate the emergence of such a standard as it will help them demonstrate their high 
performance to the market.  
This idea was developed not with regard to consumers but with regard to employee satisfaction 
in one recommendation of the 2020 Summit:  
Windows on workplaces: Empower employees to choose their preferred workplaces 
by facilitating the dissemination of information about employment experience, for 
example work-life-balance and family friendliness. 
Such a scheme might be commenced in the manner outlined above, with governments doing no 
more than initiating a process by which high performing employers were drawn together, either 
publicly or privately, with a view to their developing an auditable standard against which to 
report. Governments could also use their own influence in markets to help the standard 
                                                        
12 Garnaut Climate Change Review (2008), Draft Report, p. 454. 
13 See Gruen, Nicholas, ‘Life in the Farce Lane: The steady creep of regulatory burdens’. IPA Review, pp. 
11–12. April 2006. 
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emerge, both by mandating that, where relevant, their own agencies report against the standard 
and by encouraging or requiring those firms with which it does business to report against the 
standard.  
A potential problem is that even if the group of firms establishing the standard were of well 
above average standard, those firms ending up at the bottom of the list of high performers 
could be invidiously interpreted to be poor performers.  
To guard against this problem it may be appropriate to commission the ABS to determine 
average performance with a randomised survey of firms more generally. Firms’ performance 
could then be reported against the backdrop of appropriate Australian or industry wide 
averages.  
The appeal of this approach is that, while it does not cover the whole market, it is entirely 
consensual and so can be done at minimal risk of imposing substantial costs. And despite its 
absence of coercion, it may nevertheless sufficiently improve the flow of information in 
markets to generate strong rewards for the best performers and so spur the most innovative 
and excellent firms to renew their efforts to further excel. 
Recommendation 7.5 Explore the potential of facilitating the emergence of auditable standards to 
encourage better comparative voluntary reporting of the quality of firm performance. 
 Areas where substantial gains seem likely include: 
 the quality of workplaces as proposed at the 2020 Summit; 
 the quality of clinical units in hospitals that wish to participate; and 
 the performance of educational institutions at all levels in raising students’ academic 
scores. 
Governments can also play an important role in enhancing information flows to encourage the 
formation of new markets that can facilitate the development and use of new emerging and 
enabling technologies.  
Enabling technologies have widespread applications in many fields of science, industry, 
environment, agriculture and social outcomes like health. Their responsible use and 
management involves an uncommon degree of complexity and uncertainty and because they 
don’t fit into existing industry categories, there is a lack of statistics and other metrics. Current 
examples of enabling technologies are ICT, nanotechnology, and biotechnology but other 
technologies can emerge in the future with similar or greater potential. 
Governments need to be informed about enabling technologies and aware of potential issues 
and problems to develop appropriate policies and regulation. Regulation plays an important role 
in contributing to the community’s confidence in a new technology, therefore facilitating 
acceptance and diffusion into the broader economy and society. Regulation based on sound 
scientific evidence can stimulate, not hinder, innovation. 
The community also needs to have access to balanced and objective information from trusted 
sources so that they can make informed choices. Where the risks and opportunities are not 
clear, views can become polarised, regulation can be risk-adverse and the community can 
develop unrealistic expectations about opportunities.  
There is a role for Government in: 
 providing support where there are information asymmetries and large spillovers;  
 providing the community with balanced and factual information; 
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 supporting the science and metrology essential to underpin effective regulation; and 
 ensuring regulation supports the adoption of innovative services and products. 
Recommendation 7.6 Facilitate favourable conditions for the development and use of new and 
emerging technologies by establishing appropriately funded enabling technologies strategies 
that: 
 adapt or build regulatory frameworks to support the responsible and safe use of 
innovative services and products; 
 support the science and metrology required to underpin effective regulation and 
capitalise on opportunities; 
 foster public awareness and community engagement; and 
 collect data and develop metrics to support evidence based policy development, 
monitoring and evaluation. 
UNLOCKING PUBLIC INFORMATION AND CONTENT 
Governments and public agencies are centrally involved in the provision of research, 
information and content across a very broad range of activities. For some years now, both 
commercial and policy focus has turned towards the economic and social benefits flowing from 
open access to these resources, and by contrast, the potential costs and ‘value damming’ that 
can be involved in ‘business as usual’ models where content is more tightly held.  
Much work has been done by other national governments and international organisations on 
the development of policies and systems to enable public sector information access and re-
use.14  
Open access requirements are increasingly being introduced by research funding organisations 
and research institutions worldwide.15 To date progress in Australia has been patchy and lacking 
the comprehensiveness and boldness of leading countries such as the UK. Australian activities 
aimed at enabling information access and re-use have largely focused on two key areas: spatial 
data and publicly funded research outputs (whether in the form of publications or data). Much 
of the impetus for access to public sector materials has come from the spatial community. The 
most advanced policy on data access is the Spatial Data Access and Pricing Policy (2001) developed 
by the Office of Spatial Data Management16 which forms the basis of the free data download 
services offered by Geoscience Australia.17  
Along with the rise in support for access to information has come a growing recognition of the 
need for users to be able to search and interact with data and content. Legal frameworks must 
                                                        
14 Houghton, J., Steele, C. and Sheehan, P., Research Communication Costs in Australia: Emerging Opportunities and 
Benefits. DEST. 2006, at www.dest.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/0ACB271F-EA7D-4FAFB3F7-
0381F441B175/13935/DEST_Research_Communications_Cost_Report_Sept2006.pdf;. Houghton, Steele 
and Sheehan concluded in their 2006 report that open access models of scholarly communication have the 
potential to increase the economic and social returns from public investment in R&D. 
15 For an international listing of open access mandates, see ROARMAP at 
www.eprints.org/openaccess/policysignup/. Some of the most significant initiatives have occurred in the 
European Union and in the United Kingdom. 
16 See www-ext.osdm.gov.au/osdm/policy/accessPricing/SDAP.pdf and generally 
www.osdm.gov.au/OSDM/Policies+and+Guidelines/Spatial+Data+Access+and+Pricing/default.aspx.  
17 See www.ga.gov.au/products/servlet/controller?event=DEFINE_PRODUCTS. 
 Venturous Australia: Information and Market Design 585 
 
also be developed to facilitate access and re-use. This points to the need for an Australian 
National Information Policy (or Strategy) that optimises the generation and flow of ideas and 
information in the Australian economy. As the National Competition Policy (NCP) involved 
systematically scanning Australian institutions to optimise the operation of competition to 
enhance outcomes so National Information Policy would scan Australian institutions to 
optimise the generation and dissemination of information for social and economic benefit.18  
Support for development and implementation of a National Information Policy was expressed 
at forums held during the public consultation round table as well as in several written 
submissions with the spatial information industry being particularly supportive. Further 
government funded ‘content’ is generally in the same category as government funded 
information. Thus for instance, unless it seriously undermines its commercial objectives of sale 
of product, the ABC should err on the side of making its content available over the internet 
unless this has large opportunity costs. The presumption against free availability might be 
overcome where it would involve the foregoing of substantial commercial revenue from the sale 
of the content or there are large costs of hosting the necessary internet bandwidth (although in 
this latter case, peer to peer means of distribution should also be explored as should the 
diversion of funding from other activities and/or additional funding). 
Australia is behind many other advanced countries in establishing institutional frameworks to 
maximise the flow of government generated information and content. 
Recommendation 7.7 Australia should establish a National Information Strategy to optimise the 
flow of information in the Australian economy. 
The fundamental aim of a National Information Strategy should be to: 
 utilise the principles of targeted transparency and the development of auditable 
standards to maximise the flow of information in private markets about product 
quality; and 
 maximise the flow of government generated information, research, and content for the 
benefit of users (including private sector resellers of information). 
 
Recommendation 7.8 Australian governments should adopt international standards of open 
publishing as far as possible. Material released for public information by Australian 
governments should be released under a creative commons licence. 
NATIONAL COLLECTIONS 
To drive cumulative knowledge creation researchers and others must have access to high quality 
data and information on developments not just in their field but beyond. For instance, Jeff 
Furman and Scott Stern have calculated that Biological Resource Centres that are repositories 
                                                        
18See Gans, J., Caught short: Information controls kill opportunities, The Age, 5th August 2008, who argues 
that information such as the location of public toilets (toiletmap.gov.au), fuel price information, bus and 
train schedules, and television programming information be available for repackaging using the latest 
technologies. Led by Cabinet Office Minister Tom Watson MP, the UK has established a ‘Power of 
Information Taskforce’ for this purpose. (www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/power_of_information.aspx) 
In Australia, Hansard information made available has led to re-packaging and dissemination 
(www.openaustralia.org). 
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of biological materials (including cell lines, microorganisms and DNA material) have boosted 
cumulative scientific knowledge by three times more than alternative institutional structures.19 
Australian physicist Michael Nielsen has stressed the importance of unlocking scientific 
information in scientific journals to make it more easily discoverable, searchable and useable to 
enable the cross-disciplinary search for knowledge: 
We should aim to create an open scientific culture where as much information as 
possible is moved out of people’s heads and labs, onto the network, and into tools 
which can help us structure and filter the information. This means everything – 
data, scientific opinions, questions, ideas, folk knowledge, workflows, and everything 
else – the works. Information not on the network can’t do any good.20 
He goes on to recommend a change in basic infrastructure of science as well as mind-sets and 
culture: 
Ideally, we’ll achieve a kind of extreme openness. This means: making many more 
types of content available than just scientific papers; allowing creative re-use and 
modification of existing work through more open licensing and community norms; 
making all information not just human readable but also machine readable; providing 
open APIs [application programming interfaces] to enable the building of additional 
services on top of the scientific literature, and possibly even multiple layers of 
increasingly powerful services. Such extreme openness is the ultimate expression of 
the idea that others may build upon and extend the work of individual scientists in 
ways they themselves would never have conceived. 
This sense was reflected in the many submissions that emphasised that national collections are a 
necessary foundation for research and innovation. National collections21 are essential resources 
for researchers in all fields, from basic scientific research to the social sciences, humanities and 
creative arts. They play a vital role for educators (from pre-school to postgraduate) and for the 
broader community in building scientific, historical and artistic knowledge and literacy and in 
fostering cultural knowledge, identity and cohesion. Importantly, Australia has a number of 
unique and valuable assets, including marine, flora and fauna resources and indigenous 
collections that allow us to draw on the distinctive features of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander traditional knowledge systems. 
The Review has examined challenges in the provision, funding and maintenance of national 
infrastructure facilities and collections and identified the steps required to ensure their ongoing 
vitality and contribution to the national innovation system over the coming decades. 
 
Recommendation 7.9 Funding models and institutional mandates should recognise the research 
and innovation role and contributions of cultural agencies and institutions responsible for 
information repositories, physical collections or creative content and fund them accordingly. 
                                                        
19 Furman, J. and Stern, S., Standing Atop the Shoulders of Giants: The Impact of Institutions on Cumulative Research, 
National Bureau Economic Research Working Paper. 2004. 
20 michaelnielsen.org/blog/?p=448.  
21 These include cultural, geological, historical and zoological collections. They go under a number of 
different names, including archives, galleries, research repositories, libraries, museums, Indigenous 
knowledge and keeping places.  
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 Recommendation 7.10 A specific strategy for ensuring the scientific knowledge produced in 
Australia is placed in machine searchable repositories be developed and implemented using 
public funding agencies and universities as drivers. 
Recommendation 7.11 Action should be taken to establish an agreed framework for the 
designation, funding models, and access frameworks for key collections in recognition of the 
national and international significance of many State and Territory collections (similar to the 
frameworks and accords developed around Australia’s Major Performing Arts Companies). 
Recommendation 7.12 Funding agencies should consider eligibility for cultural and collecting 
agencies in gaining access to contestable research funding programs. 
Recommendation 7.13 The role of institutions such as the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS) should be broadened and strengthened in recognition 
of the special importance of preserving indigenous collections and the unique value of 
indigenous traditional knowledge and practices within Australia’s innovation system.  
AUSTRALIA, INNOVATION AND THE GLOBAL PUBLIC COMMONS 
ABC free to air broadcasts used to be Australian public goods. Today, digital distribution over 
the internet makes them global public goods. The same could be said for a good deal of 
information and other content produced and funded by government agencies.  
There can be clear benefits in making such content available to all comers globally. Often it will 
be impossible to foresee all the ways in which others will find or develop value in that content. 
And there will be negligible costs in making the content available.  
Accordingly, both for its direct and indirect benefits to Australia and for the greater global 
good, Australia should energetically and proudly maximise the extent to which it makes 
government funded content available as part of the global digital commons.  
Further, it should lead globally by engaging other countries in a similar agenda.  
Likewise in the area of prizes, Australia should encourage other countries to join it in funding 
international prizes for specific innovations. For instance it could be a particularly effective way 
of addressing aid objectives to initiate a process where many countries funded a prize of 
substantial value for important technical breakthroughs with medical or other benefits.  
Recommendation 7.14 To the maximum extent practicable, information, research and content 
funded by Australian governments – including national collections – should be made freely 
available over the internet as part of the global public commons. This should be done whilst the 
Australian Government encourages other countries to reciprocate by making their own 
contributions to the global digital pubic commons.  
Recommendation 7.15 In a similar spirit the Australian Government should initiate a process 
whereby countries come together to fund prizes for innovations of international significance 
with a particular focus on the needs of the developing world.  
